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BEYOND YOUNGBERG: PROTECTING THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
INTRODUCTION
In Youngberg v. Romeo, ' the Supreme Court held that the institu-
tionalized mentally retarded have constitutionally based liberty inter-
ests in "conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably non-
restrictive confinement conditions,"'2 and the right to such training as
may be required to ensure the protection of those interests. 3 Justice
Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, 4 maintained that a right to the
training necessary to prevent unreasonable loss of liberty as a result of
confinement must include such training as is reasonably necessary to
preserve the basic self-care skills that the person possessed when he
entered the institution. 5 He noted that "for many mentally retarded
people, the ... capacity to do things for themselves . . . is as much
liberty as they will ever know.""
This Note contends that the right to treatment advocated by Justice
Blackmun exceeds the boundaries of the right established by the ma-
jority. Nonetheless, courts should recognize a substantive right to the
training necessary to preserve basic self-care skills. Institutions often
act as mere custodians of the severely retarded. 7 Without minimal
1. 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
2. Id. at 2463.
3. Id.
4. Justice Blackmun was joined by Justices Brennan and O'Connor. 102 S. Ct.
at 2463.
5. Id. at 2464 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun felt that a loss of
skills resulting from the state's unreasonable refusal to train was a loss of liberty
"distinct from-and as serious as-the loss" of liberty which the majority sought to
remedy. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
6. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
7. See G. Dybwad, Challenges in Mental Retardation 209 (1964). The more
severely retarded have often been warehoused because traditional prejudgments have
left their potential unrecognized. Id. at 102-03. Even today many severely retarded
persons are placed in remote state institutions where they receive mere custodial care.
Herr, The New Clients: Legal Services for Mentally Retarded Persons, 31 Stan. L.
Rev. 553, 557 (1979); see R. Scheerenberger, Deinstitutionalization and Institutional
Reform 12 (1976) (the severely or profoundly retarded are custodial cases, requiring
almost complete care and supervision). According to the most frequently quoted
estimate, the severely and profoundly retarded comprise about five percent of all
retarded people. Id. at 12-13. The American Association on Mental Deficiency
categorizes the severely and profoundly retarded as those persons with I.Q.'s ranging
from 0 to 35. Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1237
(W.D. Ky. 1980), aff'd, 674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1982).
There has been growing acceptance, however, of the possibility of training even
the most severely retarded. See Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 495 (D. Minn.
1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1122
(8th Cir. 1977); R. Scheerenberger, supra, at 12; Vogel, Effects of Environmental
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training these individuals often regress, losing the ability to attend to
their most basic needs. 8
Part I of this Note examines the Youngberg decision to determine
the scope of the right to training recognized by the majority. It then
considers the historical development of constitutional substantive
rights in order to determine whether recognition of the broader right
recognized by Justice Blackmun is consistent with this development.
Part II discusses the various theories that lower courts have developed
to support a general right to habilitation. Concluding that the Court is
unlikely to employ these theories to establish such a general habilita-
tive right, Part III maintains that the training required to preserve
basic self-care skills is necessary to protect recognized constitutional
rights. This Note contends, therefore, that the institutionalized men-
tally retarded have a substantive right to that training-a right not to
regress-that can only be denied if the state has a substantial justifica-
tion.
Enrichment and Environmental Deprivation on Cognitive Functioning in Institu-
tionalized Retardates, 31 J. Consulting Psychology 570, 575-76 (1967).
8. Brief for Respondent at 22, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982);
accord Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (describing a state
school and hospital as a "warehousing" institution, incapable of providing habilita-
tion, and therefore conducive to deterioration of residents) (quoting Mar. 2, 1972
unreported interim order), aff'd, remanded, and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); see Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v.
Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1240 (W.D. Ky. 1980) (evidence that some residents'
records indicated fewer skills after residence at state school than when admitted),
aff'd, 674 F.2d 582 (6th Cir. 1982); Armstrong v. Kline, 476 F. Supp. 583, 588 (E.D.
Pa. 1979) (the more profoundly retarded a person is, the quicker he loses skills that
are not practiced), remanded on other grounds sub nom. Battle v. Commonwealth,
629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981); Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1309-10 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
(reports of physical deterioration, behavioral regression, and loss of skills among
Pennhurst residents), ajf'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en
bane, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Brief of Amici Curiae
American Orthopsychiatric Association, American Psychological Association, Associ-
ation for Retarded Citizens of the United States, Mental Health Association and
National Association of Social Workers at 10-11, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct.
2452 (1982) (lack of practice in already-acquired skills causes institutional residents to
"learn helplessness") [hereinafter cited as Brief of Amici Curiae]; Herr, supra note 7,
at 557 (lack of treatment and training causes physical atrophy and intellectual
deterioration); Mitchell & Smeriglio, Growth in Social Competence in Institutional-
ized Mentally Retarded Children, 74 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 666, 669 (1970)
(institution residents receiving routine care suffered "a marked deficiency in social
competence development").
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I. A FOUNDATION FOR THE RIGHT TO TRAINING
A. The Youngberg Analysis
The Supreme Court approached the question of a substantive right
to training for the first time in Youngberg v, Romeo., Relying on its
recognition in penal cases that personal security and freedom from
bodily restraint are basic rights that survive confinement, ' 0 the Court
held that the institutionalized mentally retarded are entitled to the
training required to avoid unnecessary infringement of those rights."
It ruled that an institution is not justified in physically restraining an
individual because of his violent or aggressive tendencies when train-
ing would eliminate the need for such restraint.12
The Court held that the right to be free from bodily restraint was
derived from a basic liberty interest cognizable under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 13 It further stated that the mere
use of proper procedures in confining a person does not justify the
9. 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2457 (1982). Twice previously the Court had been con-
fronted with cases involving the right to treatment. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In
Halderman, however, the circuit court had found a federal statutory right to treat-
ment in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, Pub. L. No.
94-103, § 201, 89 Stat. 486, 502-03 (1975) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6010 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)). Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 95-96
& n.15 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The Supreme Court reversed without
considering the issue of a constitutional right to treatment. See 451 U.S. at 31. In
O'Connor, the Fifth Circuit held that minimally adequate treatment must be pro-
vided to the involuntarily civilly committed. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507,
520-22 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563
(1975). The Supreme Court, however, remanded the case for a determination
whether the district court had erred in refusing to give a requested jury instruction.
422 U.S. at 576-77.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 2458; see Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correc-
tional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) ("[ljiberty from bodily restraint [is] the core of the liberty protected. . . from
arbitrary governmental action"); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1978)
(personal security); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 62, 79 (1982)
[hereinafter 1981 Term].
11. 102 S. Ct. at 2460; see 1981 Term, supra note 10, at 79.
12. See 102 S. Ct. at 2462-63. The state must provide training "to facilitate [the
individual's] ability to function free from bodily restraints." Id. at 2462.
13. Id. at 2458; see Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(freedom from bodily restraint is at the core of due process clause liberty); Ingraham
v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977) (liberty protected by the fifth amendment
due process clause, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment,
includes freedom from bodily restraint).
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deprivation of all liberty interests. 14 Consequently, a state must pro-
vide additional procedural safeguards for the liberty interests of the
institutionalized mentally retarded.' 5 Only when no other way is
available to protect the individual may the state justifiably deprive the
institutionalized individual of his right to personal security and free-
dom from physical restraint. Arguably, providing training is itself the
procedure the state must undertake. 6
Requiring training as a procedure to protect fundamental rights
suggests that a broader habilitative right may exist. 17 The Court did
not address this broader right, however, noting that the issue before it
did not involve training apart from that necessary to protect recog-
nized interests in safety and freedom from physical restraints. 8
14. 102 S. Ct. at 2458; see Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980) (criminal
conviction extinguishes right to freedom from confinement for length of prison
sentence, but absent additional due process protections, state cannot classify prisoner
as mentally ill and subject him to involuntary treatment). Fourteenth amendment
due process rights follow convicted persons into prison, protecting them from uncon-
stitutional action of prison authorities "carried out under color of state law." Wash-
ington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966), affd per curiam, 390 U.S.
333 (1968); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974); Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
15. See 102 S. Ct. at 2458; cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (prisoner
entitled to procedural protection before being classified as mentally ill and subjected
to treatment). According to the Youngberg Court, involuntarily committed individ-
uals retain more rights than the imprisoned. See 102 S. Ct. at 2458; accord Romeo v.
Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane) (shackling, unless for protec-
tion and treatment of patient, violates the liberty right of a retarded person who has
committed no crime), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982).
16. The Youngberg majority held that the Constitution requires such minimally
adequate training as is reasonable in light of the individual's rights to safety and
freedom from restraint. 102 S. Ct. at 2461. It appears, therefore, that only if the state
has already attempted such reasonable training is it justified in depriving institution-
alized retarded persons of their rights. See id. Due process is a flexible concept, and
the procedural protections called for vary depending upon the demands of the
particular situation. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); see Ingraham v.
Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 678-79 & n.47 (1977).
17. See 1981 Term, supra note 10, at 80. The scope of the right to training as a
post-commitment due process protection would depend on the extent to which a
grievous loss would otherwise be suffered. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
(1972). The nature rather than the weight of the interest is determinative. Meachum
v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976). It must be an interest within the contemplation of
the fourteenth amendment. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). Four-
teenth amendment due process then affords "not only a procedural guarantee against
the deprivation of 'liberty,' but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against
unconstitutional restrictions by the State." Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244
(1976).
18. 102 S. Ct. at 2459 & n.23. By deriving a right from traditionally protected
recognized freedoms, the Court failed to resolve lower court confusion on the right to
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If the interpretation of the due process clause employed by the
majority merely guarantees training as a procedural protection for
existing constitutional rights, ' 9 that interpretation cannot be used to
supplant state judgments as to the protections that non-constitutional
rights should be afforded. 20 Consequently, only if a constitutional
basis for the interests Justice Blackmun seeks to protect is identified
would the notion of due process relied upon by the majority protect
those interests. 2 '
The right to training advocated by Justice Blackmun is derived
from a broader notion of due process clause liberty.2 2 Blackmun stated
that loss of basic self-care skills during confinement as a result of the
state's unreasonable refusal to provide training represents "a loss of
liberty quite distinct from-and as serious as-the loss of safety and
freedom from unreasonable restraint. '23 Unlike the limited right to
training established by the majority, 24 the right Justice Blackmun
advances implicates liberty interests not previously incorporated
within the fourteenth amendment. 25 The majority noted that "[lib-
treatment. Compare Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 119 (N.D. Ohio 1979)
(individual committed for his own protection has no independent right to treatment)
with Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315-16
(E.D. Pa. 1977) (the only justification for an institution like Pennhurst is providing
habilitation), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc,
612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
19. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.
20. See Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 68-70 (1978) (case
does not involve fundamental right to vote, so Court subjects state statute to minimal
scrutiny); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35-40 (1973)
(education is not a fundamental right, so state legislation need be only rationally
related to legitimate state purposes); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-87
(1970) (Court declined to question wisdom of state legislation affecting welfare
benefits because they are not recognized constitutional rights).
21. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 n.25 (1982).
22. See id. at 2464 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun referred to
unreasonable bodily restraints and unsafe institutional conditions as just two exam-
pies of post-commitment deprivation of liberty. Id.
23. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). But see Association for Retarded Citizens v.
Olson, No. 80-141, slip op. at 27 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982) (court broadly interprets
the right to freedom from restraint to support an habilitative right similar to that
advocated by Justice Blackmun); Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 519 (N.D.N.Y.
1981) (court prevents state infringement of interest in personal autonomy by broadly
interpreting the freedom of locomotion protected in Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d
147, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102
S. Ct. 2452 (1982)).
24. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
25. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 672-74 (1977). The Court in Ingra-
ham stated that personal security and freedom from restraint are liberty interests
protected by the fifth amendment and incorporated by the fourteenth amendment.
The Court in Youngberg could therefore predicate a right to training on the need to
protect these interests. 102 S. Ct. at 2460-63. Justice Blackmun, however, refers to no
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erty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the core of
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. ' 26 It found, there-
fore, that the state has a duty to protect the involuntarily committed
individual from loss of that liberty.27 Deriving a right to training from
general notions of liberty, however, rather than from the need to
protect identified rights, is inconsistent with the Court's practice of
protecting only fundamental interests implicitly or explicitly found in
the Constitution. 28
B. The Concept of Liberty Under the Fourteenth Amendment
Between 1897 and 1937,29 the Court liberally applied the liberty
component of the due process clause to protect individual liberty from
specific liberty interest on which to predicate a broader right to training. See id. at
2464-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 2460 n.25 (federal court must identify
constitutional predicate for imposing duty on state). He does, however, state that
personal autonomy is implicated whenever basic self-care skills are concerned. 102 S.
Ct. at 2465 (Blackmun, J., concurring); cf. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250-53
(1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (right to determine one's appearance is protected by
the fifth amendment and is an aspect of personal autonomy which the Constitution is
designed to protect) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Kent v.
Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958)); Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141,
slip op. at 25 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982) (personal autonomy is an element of the right
to be free from restraint); Philipp v. Carey, 517 F. Supp. 513, 519 (N.D.N.Y. 1981)
(right to treatment ensures that custody by the state will not interfere with funda-
mental liberty interest like personal autonomy).
26. 102 S. Ct. at 2458 (emphasis added) (quoting Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part)).
27. See id. at 2462-63.
28. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973)
(a right, to be fundamental, must be explicitly or implicitly found in the Constitu-
tion); Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1979) (liberty protected
by fourteenth amendment due process encompasses only specific provisions of the Bill
of Rights, and fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty")
(quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled in part, Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980); Schwartz, A
"New" Fourteenth Amendment: The Decline of State Action, Fundamental Rights,
and Suspect Classifications under the Burger Court, 56 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 865, 878-80
(1980) (only rights explicitly or implicitly found in the Constitution are protected by
strict judicial scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment). The list of non-textual
rights found fundamental by the Court is fairly short. J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, Constitutional Law 418 (1978). The Court attempts to justify these rights as
extensions of the Bill of Rights, see L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 570, 893
(1978), or it may recognize them simply because they are essential to society's concept
of liberty, J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra, at 416.
29. These years generally mark the duration of the substantive due process era.
See L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 435; Douglas, Harlan Fiske Stone Centennial Lec-
ture: The Meaning of Due Process, 10 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 1, 5 (1973); Henkin,
1069
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"unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference. '30 The Court
examined state and federal regulatory legislation to determine
whether the legislation had a "real and substantial" relationship to its
objectives, thereby not unreasonably infringing upon individual lib-
erty.3' In the late 1930's, however, the Court abandoned this practice
of judicial activism and began treating legislative judgments as pre-
sumptively constitutional.32 More recently, it reaffirmed its displeas-
ure with the substantive use of the due process clause to protect
individuals from legislative judgments, stating that "it is up to legisla-
tures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. 33
The Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that due
process liberty provides the individual with substantive constitutional
protection from government action. In a much-disputed footnote to
Privacy and Autonomy, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 1410, 1414-15 (1974); Monaghan, Of
"Liberty" and "Property, " 62 Cornell L. Rev. 405, 412-14 (1977). Compare Allgeyer
v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591-93 (1897) (striking down a statute interfering with
the right to contract) with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398-99
(1937) (upholding minimum wage law). See generally J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J.
Young, supra note 28, at 397-404 (brief review of substantive due process era).
30. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905). Due process clause liberty
received a broad interpretation during the substantive due process era. In addition to
freedom from physical restraint, liberty included the free enjoyment of one's facul-
ties, freedom to live and work where one wished, and freedom to earn one's liveli-
hood by any lawful calling, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897), the right
to contract, the right to acquire useful knowledge, the right to marry and establish a
home, the right to worship God according to the dictates of one's conscience, and the
right "generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men," Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923).
31. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (statute
requiring children to attend public school unconstitutionally interferes with parents'
liberty to raise children as they choose); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923)
(statute prohibiting the teaching of foreign languages to grade school students not
adequately related to purpose of protecting children's health); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1923) (minimum wage law an unconstitutional inter-
ference with right to contract), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81-82 (1917) (ordinance preventing
blacks and whites from living in the same neighborhood struck down as an unreason-
able interference with right to dispose of one's property); Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (statute limiting number of hours in the work week purports to
protect workers' health but does not, thereby unreasonably infringing freedom to
contract); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 592-93 (1897) (statute interfering
with freedom to contract struck down).
32. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938)
("existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed"); West
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) ("regulation which is reasonable
in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the community is due
process"); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934) ("subject only to constitu-
tional restraint the private right must yield to the public need").
33. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
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its decision in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 34 the Court
suggested that the presumption of constitutionality was not as strong
when specific constitutional prohibitions for the benefit of fundamen-
tal rights, such as those expressed in the Bill of Rights, are involved.3 5
From this suggestion developed the practice of selectively incorporat-
ing those rights "fundamental to the American scheme of justice" 36
into the due process clause. 37 The justification for this practice is that
the Bill of Rights offers clear constitutional guidance to the Court for
supplanting the judgment of the legislature with its own.38 Because
34. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
35. Id.; see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone, C.J., concur-
ring) ("There are limits to the extent to which the presumption of constitutionality
can be pressed, especially where the liberty of the person is concerned .... ). See
generally Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 Colum. L.
Rev. 1093 (1982) (explaining the genesis of the footnote and legal developments
which followed from it).
36. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
37. See L. Tribe, supra note 28, 567-69; Lusky, supra note 35, at 1102. The
doctrine of selective incorporation succeeded the "fundamental fairness" doctrine as
the majority position regarding fourteenth amendment absorption of fundamental
rights against the states. See Israel, Selective Incorporation Revisited, 71 Geo. L.J.
253, 286 (1982). Under the fundamental fairness doctrine, fourteenth amendment
due process prohibits state action that violates personal rights found "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and basic to society. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937), overruled in part, Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 26-28 (1949), overruled in part on other grounds, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). This doctrine posits that fourteenth amendment due
process neither comprehends nor is confined to the Bill of Rights. See Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46, 66 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). Although funda-
mental fairness was the accepted device for interpreting fourteenth amendment due
process, Justice Black advocated total incorporation of the Bill of Rights against the
states. Id. at 71-72 (Black, J., dissenting); Israel, supra, at 286. Black's dissent in
Adamson "contributed substantially" to the acceptance of selective incorporation. Id.
See generally Douglas, supra note 29, at 7-11 (describing various interpretations of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment).
38. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-48 (1968) (Supreme Court has
looked increasingly to the Bill of Rights to protect individual rights); Israel, supra
note 37, at 286-87 (one advantage of selective incorporation is that it depends less on
the subjective whim of the Court than does fundamental fairness). The Court had
applied certain guarantees of the Bill of Rights against the states prior to adoption of
the selective incorporation doctrine. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28-29
(1949) (search and seizure, but not the exclusionary rule), overruled in part, Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (using selective incorporation to include the
exclusionary rule); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) (basic rights to fair trial).
This is especially true of first amendment guarantees. See Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (establishment and free exercise of religion); Hague v.
Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 519 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring) (free-
dom of speech and assembly); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (peaceful
assembly); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (free press and free speech);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (same).
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the rights recognized by the Youngberg majority had previously been
identified as part of the "historic liberty interest" protected by the
fifth amendment, 39 the majority's ruling is consistent with the prac-
tice of protecting from state action only selectively incorporated
rights. 40
In other contexts, however, such as those in which certain civil or
human rights were threatened, the Court has substituted its judgment
for that of the state in the absence of an established constitutional
directive. 41 Strict standards of review 42 have been devised when state
action touches on those fundamental rights "implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty" embodied in the Constitution. 43 The Court has recog-
The Bill of Rights guarantees incorporated since the advent of selective incorpora-
tion largely include rights of criminal procedure. See, e.g., Papachristou v. Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972) (fourth amendment probable cause requirement);
Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971) (eighth amendment proscription of
excessive bail assumed to apply to states); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794
(1969) (fifth amendment double jeopardy prohibition); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth amendment right to jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967) (sixth amendment right to compulsory process); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965) (sixth amendment right to confront adverse wit-
nesses); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (fifth amendment prohibition of
compulsory self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-44 (1963)
(sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 666-67 (1962) (eighth amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punish-
ment).
39. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982) (citing Greenholtz v.
Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (Powell,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) and Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,
672-74 (1977)).
40. See supra notes 28, 36-38 and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry) (majority
applying equal protection, and Justice Stewart, concurring, applying due process
analysis); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion rights); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972) (right to custody of one's children); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives by married couples); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate) (majority employing equal protection, and
Chief Justice Stone, concurring, employing due process).
42. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S., 113, 155 (1973) (state action can only limit
fundamental rights when justified by "compelling state interest"); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497-98 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (compelling inter-
est, or state action necessary to effectuate permissible state policy); Dowben, Legal
Rights of the Mentally Impaired, 16 Hous. L. Rev. 833, 879 (1979) (acknowledging
Court's use of a compelling state interest test). One Justice criticized the Court for
transposing the compelling state interest test from equal protection considerations to
a due process case. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart has stated, however, that in some fundamental rights
cases equal protection "is no more than substantive due process by another name."
Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 395 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Sotto v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 184, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1979) (quoting Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), overruled in part, Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969)), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950 (1980).
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nized such non-textual rights as freedom of association, 44 the right to
vote, 45 the right to travel46 and the right to privacy.47 A constitutional
basis for these rights is found by locating them within "penumbras" of
the Bill of Rights48 or deeming them implicit in the Constitution, 49
44. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958). Freedom of association is
protected by the first amendment. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18 (1966);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507 (1964). The right may be abridged
only to the extent that it is abused, such as by assembling to incite violence or crime.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364-65 (1937). When the right is abridged the
restrictions must not "sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms." Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964)
(quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
45. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). The Constitution ex-
pressly prohibits denial by the states of the right to vote on the basis of race, U.S.
Const. amend. XV, § 1, sex, id. amend. XIX, § 1, age, id. amend. XXVI, § 1, or
because of "failure to pay any poll tax or other tax," id. amend. XXIV, § 1. Although
it prohibits the use of these franchise requirements, however, the Constitution does
not expressly grant a right to vote. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has established
the right to vote as a fundamental right within the fourteenth amendment, stating:
"[u]ndoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter ... [e]specially since
the right to exercise the franchise ... is preservative of other basic civil and political
rights ...... Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964). Therefore, alleged
infringements are subject to strict scrutiny. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395
U.S. 621, 626 (1969); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
46. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) ("The right to travel is a part of
the 'liberty' of which the citizen cannot be deprived without due process of law....
Freedom of movement is basic in our scheme of values."); see Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342
(1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969).
47. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). "[T]he First Amend-
ment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion." Id.
at 483; see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-54 (1972). The right to privacy
consists of two interrelated strands: "One is the individual interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making
certain kinds of important decisions." Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). Justice Brandeis characterized "the right to be let alone" as "the
right most valued by civilized men." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled on other grounds, Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
48. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965); Ely, The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 928 (1973) (penum-
bra concept as the basis for privacy right leading to right to abortion); Henkin, supra
note 29, at 1421-23 (penumbra concept leading to general right to privacy);
Sprecher, Mr. Justice Douglas, 51 Ind. L.J. 6, 11 (1975) (same); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Theory of Individuality: The Privacy Opinions of Justice Douglas, 87
Yale L.J. 1579, 1585-87 (1978) (penumbral approach a substitute for natural rights
approach to constitutional interpretation).
49. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (right to inter-
state travel so elementary that it is a "necessary concomitant") (quoting United States
v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966)); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961)
("[F]reedom of association is included in the bundle of First Amendment rights made
applicable to the States by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
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and therefore entitled to protection from unreasonable state intru-
sion.5 0 Thus, while the Court might hesitate to derive a substantive
right to training from a concept of general due process liberty, 51 it
could derive the right advocated by Justice Blackmun from recognized
penumbras of the Constitution-the rights to free association, free
movement, privacy and autonomy-without departing from its prac-
tice of selective incorporation. 52
Falling short of constructing this constitutional standard, lower
federal courts have employed an alternative approach to establishing
a right to training in basic self-care skills. While reaching a result that
encompasses the right Justice Blackmun seeks to establish, these courts
have not found it necessary to undertake the rigors of a fundamental
rights analysis.
II. A RIGHT TO TREATMENT-THE LowER COURT ALTERNATIVES
Numerous lower courts using varying approaches have relied on the
state's role in confining the individual to establish a constitutional
right to training53 that extends beyond the preservation of basic
skills.5 4 For instance, if an institutionalized individual has not
Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958) (right to foreign travel an element of
fifth amendment liberty, since "[f]reedom of movement is basic in our scheme of
values").
50. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977)
(privacy); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974) (travel);
Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971) (association); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (vote).
51. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
52. See infra pt. III.
53. Courts generally refer to a right to treatment when dealing with the mentally
ill and a right to training or habilitation when the retarded are concerned. Compare
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974) (a person civilly commit-
ted to a state mental hospital has a right to treatment giving him a reasonable
opportunity to be cured), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563
(1975), with Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (state that confines retarded person must provide minimally
adequate habilitation), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en
banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), revd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). To avoid potential
confusion from using these terms interchangeably, in this section of the text treat-
ment will be used to denote the general concept, encompassing both treatment and
training, and training will be employed in reference to particular case holdings
concerning the retarded.
54. E.g., Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (right
to treatment arises upon involuntary confinement, whether state's rationale is parens
patriae or police power), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982); Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1978) (due process
clause compels minimally adequate treatment); Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305,
1314 (5th Cir. 1974) (minimally adequate habilitation is the quid pro quo for
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committed any crime, imprisonment without treatment may violate
his substantive due process rights,5 5 on the theory that a mental
hospital that does not treat mental illness is in effect a mental prison A6
One court has concluded that confinement of the retarded without
training is essentially incarceration due to status 5 7-a practice held
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Robinson v. California.58
Other courts have ruled that by confining a person for treatment or
protection the state assumes the role of the parent, and thus has a
parens patriae duty to furnish care and treatment. 59 Without a
involuntary civil confinement); Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.
1974) (same), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Associa-
tion for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141, slip op. at 26-27 (D.N.D. Aug. 31,
1982) (holding that a right to training exists, which will support freedom from
arbitrary restraints); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp.
1295, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (when state involuntarily commits retarded persons, it
must provide habilitation affording a reasonable opportunity to acquire and main-
tain essential life skills for coping as effectively as capacities permit), af'd in part on
other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La.
1976) (same), aff'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979); Welsch v. Likins,
373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974) (due process clause compels minimally
adequate treatment), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds,
550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala.
1972) (institution residents have a right to treatment providing a realistic chance for a
more useful and meaningful life), aff'd, remanded, and reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
55. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A. J. 499, 503 (1960). The right
to treatment as advocated by Birnbaum dealt with the mentally ill. See id. It was
first extended to the retarded in Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala.
1972), afJ'd, remanded, and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
56. Birnbaum, supra note 55, at 503; accord Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451,
453 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Birnbaum's article has been credited as the genesis of the legal
right to treatment, and Rouse has been called the first significant judicial develop-
ment in the area. Murdock, Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: Some Crucial
Issues, 48 Notre Dame Law. 133, 149-50 (1972).
57. Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part,
vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977).
Without a right to treatment, hospitalization for mental retardation would be like
indefinite confinement in a penitentiary "for no convicted offense." Id. at 497
(quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
58. 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962). In Robinson, a state statute made it a criminal
offense to be addicted to narcotics. Id. at 666. The Court, considering narcotic
addiction a disease rather than a crime, likened incarceration based on addiction to
imprisonment for having the common cold. Id. at 667. Therefore, the Court stated
that it was cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
59. E.g., Johnson v. Solomon, 484 F. Supp. 278, 300 (D. Md. 1979) (right to
treatment is state's corresponding obligation in-light of its right to exercise parens
patriae power over citizens); Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908, 914-15 (W.D.
Mo. 1979) (by confining mentally ill or retarded person, the state absolutely fore-
closes any other treatment; thus such a person has a constitutional right to minimally
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training program designed to provide an institutionalized retarded
person with a realistic chance for a more useful and meaningful life, 60
the state has no constitutional justification for the deprivation of
liberty that confinement necessarily entails.6 1
A third rationale supporting the right to treatment is the quid pro
quo doctrine. When the state confines an individual against his will it
must provide a quid pro quo in the form of minimally adequate
treatment.6 2 This treatment, however, is only required when three
limitations on the state's power to detain-retribution for a specific
offense, detention for a fixed term and observation of fundamental
procedural safeguards-have not been observed.6 3 This rationale has
adequate state-provided treatment); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp.,
446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315-16 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (only justification for committing
retarded to an institution is to provide habilitation), aff'd in part on other grounds,
rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1
(1981); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (same), af-'d,
remanded, and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974); see Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 165 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (right to
treatment arises whether parens patriae or police power is rationale for commit-
ment), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
The parens patriae duty of the state is implicated when the rationale for confine-
ment is habilitation or protection of the individual. Id. at 158. Treatment prevents
the exercise of the parens patriae power from being merely a "pretext for arbitrary
governmental action." Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997 (5th Cir. 1977). Some
courts, however, may differentiate betveen confinement for care and treatment and
confinement for protection, saying care and treatment must be provided in the
former instance, but not in the latter. See Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 118-19
(N.D. Ohio 1979); cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (nature and
duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to its purpose).
60. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, remanded,
and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
61. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315
(E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc,
612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
387, 390 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, remanded, and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
62. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1313-14 (5th Cir. 1974); Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 & n.22 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D.
La. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).
63. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). The quid pro quo doctrine
applies regardless of the state's rationale for confinement. See id. at 522. The quid
pro quo theory has been criticized as analogous to eminent domain, Spece, Preserving
the Right to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of
Constitutional Right to Treatment Theories, 20 Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 8-10 (1978), because
it implies that a state can take away one's civil liberties if it is willing to pay enough.
Id. at 9. The theory, as laid out in Donaldson, gives a right to treatment only to those
persons "fortunate enough" to have been committed without strict procedural safe-
guards, and without having committed an offense, and without promise of a limited
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been used in arguing for a constitutional right to a training program
affording the individual an opportunity to acquire and maintain life
skills commensurate with his capacities. 4
Courts adjudicating the rights of the civilly committed have also
applied the constitutional doctrine of least restrictive alternative. 65
Civil commitment entails a "massive curtailment of liberty"; 66 the
or definite duration of commitment. Id. at 8-10; see 493 F.2d at 522. The Fifth
Circuit, however, subsequently restated this rationale so that the quid pro quo is due
as long as one or more of the limitations on the state's power to detain is absent. See
Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-98 (5th Cir. 1977).
Courts have also employed a due process rationale to find a right to treatment.
This rationale is based on a statement by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Indiana,
406 U.S. 715 (1972), that due process requires the nature and duration of commit-
ment to bear some reasonable relation to its purpose. Id. at 738; see Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-21 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Stuebig v. Hammel, 446 F. Supp. 31, 34 (M.D. Pa.
1977). One commentator has called this an effective theory when used correctly-to
find a right to treatment when commitment is for treatment purposes. Spece, supra,
at 12-14.
The various theories supporting a right to treatment are, to a certain extent,
interrelated. For example, treatment has been called the quid pro quo for society's
power to confine an individual in its parens patriae capacity. Mason & Menolascino,
The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and
Scientific Interface, 10 Creighton L. Rev. 124, 152-53 (1976); Kittrie, Can the Right
to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 Geo. L.J. 848, 870 (1969).
The idea that confinement without treatment is like incarceration is similar to the
quid pro quo rationale, which states that treatment must be provided when a person
is confined for no specific offense. Compare Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 496
(D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part on other grounds, 550
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977), with Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 522 (5th Cir.
1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Furthermore,
the parens patriae and due process rationales can be interwoven. If the state must
provide habilitation once it has confined a person, habilitation becomes the purpose
of the confinement; therefore if habilitation is not provided, the nature of the
confinement is not reasonably related to the purpose. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315-16 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part on other
grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981).
64. Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd
on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979).
65. See, e.g., Rone v. Fireman, 473 F. Supp. 92, 125 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Halder-
man v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1319 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d
Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1216
(E.D. La. 1976), aff'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir, 1979); Welsch v.
Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 502 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded
in part on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); cf. Johnson v. Solomon, 484
F. Supp. 278, 305 (D. Md. 1979) (no person should be institutionalized if community
can afford the person adequate care, treatment and habilitation).
66. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (quoting
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
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least restrictive alternative doctrine requires that confinement of the
retarded not unduly intrude on fundamental liberties, regardless of
governmental purpose.6 7
Some courts have criticized both the right to treatment and the
rationales supporting it. 68 The parens patriae rationale, for example,
has been challenged on the grounds that confinement under the state's
parens patriae power need not logically require treatment;6 9 states
exercising the parens patriae power have historically provided only
custodial care.70 Similarly, requiring treatment as a quid pro quo for
confinement following committal proceedings with reduced
procedural safeguards has been criticized because safeguards are less
likely to be required as the government interest increases in
importance. 7' The procedural safeguards of a criminal trial are not
needed, for example, to quarantine a person with a communicable
disease.72 Thus, if the state does not owe the safeguards in the first
place, it will not owe the individual any treatment as the quid pro quo
for not providing them.
Application of the least restrictive alternative doctrine in the civil
commitment context has been criticized as an improper extension of a
first amendment principle. 73 Moreover, the least restrictive alternative
may vary according to the needs of each resident.74 Finally, some
courts have expressed concern that the constitutional right to
67. Ferleger & Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst
Case, 31 Stan. L. Rev. 717, 738 (1979). See generally Spece, supra note 63, at 33-47
(proposing least restrictive alternative as the proper rationale for maintaining the
rights of the mentally retarded).
68. 1981 Term, supra note 10, at 81; see Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-
98 (5th Cir. 1977); New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Rockefeller, 357
F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), modified sub nom. New York State Ass'n for
Retarded Children v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 718-19 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Burnham v.
Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1341-43 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd per
curiam, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975).
69. Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. But see Brief for Respondent at 23, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982) ("It would plainly violate the Constitution for the state to quarantine [people
with] infectious disease and then deny treatment, permitting the disease to
worsen."). It has also been suggested that provision of food, clothing, shelter, medi-
cal care and supervision may be a sufficient quid pro quo for confinement without
treatment. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 125-26
(3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Garrity v.
Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 239 (D.N.H. 1981).
73. Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 237-38 (D.N.H. 1981).
74. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84, 128 (3d Cir.
1979) (en bane) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981). The least restrictive
alternative also may change over time, thereby becoming a medical question. Id.
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treatment is not a proper issue for court adjudication. 75 The Supreme
Court, however, has shown that it will require limited training as a
procedural safeguard when necessary to protect recognized liberty
interests. 70
The Court has yet to adopt any of the aforementioned lower court
rationales. Prior to Youngberg, two potential right to treatment
cases-O'Connor v. Donaldson77 and Pennhurst State School and
Hospital v. Halderman7 8-had come before the Court. Each case was
decided without reaching the issue of a constitutional right to
treatment. 79 Moreover, the Youngberg holding that there is a limited
right to training arising out of the need to protect traditionally
recognized freedoms does not resolve the continuing dispute
concerning the viability of the lower court approaches.80 It does
75. See, e.g., Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1977); Lake v.
Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 663 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (Burger, J., dissenting); Burnham v.
Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1342-43 (N.D. Ga. 1972), rev'd per
curiam, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1057 (1975). But see
Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.3 (4th Cir. 1977) (courts cannot prescribe
techniques, but if treatment is obviously called for, it must be provided); cf. Flakes v.
Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1339 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (determination of the need for
decent living conditions does not require invasion of official and medical decision-
making).
76. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460-63 (1982). See supra notes 10-11
and accompanying text.
77. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
78. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
79. In O'Connor, the Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's opinion and remanded
the case for a determination whether the trial court erred in refusing a requested jury
instruction. 422 U.S. at 576-77. The Fifth Circuit had recognized a constitutional
right to treatment. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520-22 (5th Cir. 1974),
vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). In Halderman, the Court reversed the
Third Circuit decision that had found a federal statutory right to treatment. 451 U.S.
at 31-36. The Court, therefore, did not face the issue of a constitutional right, the
issue on which the district court had pinned its decision. See Halderman v. Pennhurst
State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd in part on
other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
80. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (1982) ("this case does not
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person . . . has some
general constitutional right to training per se"). The Youngberg opinion has been
interpreted both narrowly and broadly. An internal Justice Department memo from
Civil Rights Chief William Bradford Reynolds stated that in light of Youngberg, the
Justice Department could investigate institutions to ensure resident safety and free-
dom from restraint, but not to see whether proper care and therapy is being pro-
vided. See Justice Department Moves Away from Enforcement of the Rights of
Institutionalized, 6 A.B.A. Mental Disability L. Rep. 356, 356 (1982). Reynolds
concluded in light of the Court's holding that it was not a constitutional violation to
fail to provide training to residents. Id. Arthur E. Peabody, Jr., head of the Civil
Rights Division's special litigation section, criticized this interpretation as "incorrect"
and "unnecessarily restrictive." Id. Clearly, the Court did not mean to foreclose the
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suggest, however, that the Court is reluctant to recognize and protect
a substantive right that has not previously been included in
constitutional lexicon.8 Thus, the Court may be willing to recognize
the right advocated by Justice Blackmun 2 only if that right can be
identified as protective of well-established constitutional interests.
III. A RIGHT NOT TO REGRESS
The mentally retarded possess the same constitutional rights as
other citizens, 83 which can be overborne only by an overriding state
possibility of a broader right to treatment. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452,
2459 & n.23 (1982) (the case does not present the question of a constitutional right to
habilitation per se). The Court merely opted to decide only the issue plainly before it.
Youngberg received a broader reading from the District Court of North Dakota in
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982). The
court posited that the right to freedom from undue restraint includes the right to
make small personal decisions, id. at 25, and to receive training in basic self-care, id.
at 27. The skills mentioned by the district court included "feeding, bathing, dressing,
self-control, and toilet training." Id. The court explained that maintenance of these
skills is "essential to the exercise of basic liberties." Id. The court thus reached a result
similar to that advocated by Justice Blackmun in Youngberg, see supra notes 4-5 and
accompanying text, while purporting to follow the Youngberg majority's analysis, see
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141, slip op. at 26 (D.N.D. Aug.
31, 1982). The district court's holding is probably the result of an overbroad interpre-
tation of Youngberg. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982) (Court
referring to protected liberty interest in freedom from bodily restraint). The court
did, however, concede that the Youngberg Court "closely tied the right to training to
particular liberty interests." See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-
141, slip op. at 29 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982).
81. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. at 2452, 2460 n.25 (1982) (minimally
adequate training is that which is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty interests);
1981 Term, supra note 10, at 80-81.
82. See 102 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring). It is important to note
that the right advocated by Justice Blackmun is more limited, and therefore less
onerous on the state, than habilitative rights framed by some lower courts. Training
in pre-existing basic skills is aimed more at maintaining the status quo than at
maximizing the individual's potential. Compare Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1317-18 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (state must provide
habilitation affording individuals a reasonable chance to acquire and maintain life
skills for coping as effectively as their capacities permit), affd in part on other
grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 451
U.S. 1 (1981), and Gary W. v. Louisiana, 437 F. Supp. 1209, 1219 (E.D. La. 1976)
(same), aff'd on other grounds, 601 F.2d 240 (5th Cir. 1979), and Wyatt v. Stickney,
344 F. Supp. 387, 396 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (habilitation should be suited to individual
needs, and it should enable the individual to maximize his abilities), aff'd, remanded,
and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974),
with Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2464 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(fourteenth amendment may require training to preserve skills an individual pos-
sessed when he entered the institution).
83. R. Scheerenberger, supra note 7, at 65-68; see Dowben, supra note 42, at 879
("[t]he Bill of Rights does not refer to competents and incompetents"); United Na-
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interest.8 4 The loss of basic self-care skills as a result of
institutionalization is equivalent in result to the deprivation of certain
fundamental rights, such as the rights of free association, privacy and
autonomy. By providing the training that would preserve self-care
skills, an institution could avoid the unconstitutional infringement of
those rights.
A. Implicating Fundamental Rights
Freedom of choice in marital relations, 85 freedom to choose to have
an abortion,88 freedom to control one's appearance, 87 and freedom in
other personal matters, 88 have been recognized as fundamental rights.
These non-textual constitutional rights comprise in essence a "general
right of private autonomy. 8 9 As the Court stated in Terry v. Ohio,90
"[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and
control of his own person . "... "I Due process, therefore, precludes
tions, Declaration on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons (1971) ("The mentally
retarded person has, to the maximum degree of feasibility, the same rights as other
human beings."), reprinted in part in R. Woody, Legal Aspects of Mental Retarda-
tion 46 (1974).
84. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (right to access to
courts to obtain divorce); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (freedom to
marry); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (use of contraceptives
by married couples).
86. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-66 (1973); see Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-75 (1976) (striking down parental and spousal consent
requirements); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192-200 (1973) (striking down proce-
dural requirements). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (no right to govern-
ment funding for a non-therapeutic abortion).
87. Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969) (right to wear hair as one
pleases protected by first amendment penumbras), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970);
see, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(right to determine one's appearance is an element of liberty and a part of the
autonomy the Constitution is designed to protect); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-
26 (1958) (right to travel is as close to an individual's heart as what he wears)
(dictum); Holsapple v. Woods, 500 F.2d 49, 51-52 (7th Cir.) (in the school context,
right to wear hair as one pleases is a constitutionally protected freedom), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 901 (1974).
88. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650-52 (1972) (right to custody of
one's children); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (use of contracep-
tives by unmarried persons); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (private
possession of obscene material).
89. Monaghan, supra note 29, at 414; see Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250-
51 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Henkin, supra note 29, at 1424-25.
90. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
91. Id. at 9 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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governmental conduct that does not evidence a decent respect for
personal integrity and that outrages public sensibility. 2
If the right of autonomy includes the right to choose a hairstyle 3
and the right to have an abortion, 94 it should also encompass the right
to perform tasks that are related to the well-being of one's person and
appearance9 5 absent the supervision of a state employee. Although
Justice Blackmun did not premise his extended right to training upon
a specific, recognized constitutional right, he did suggest that
mentally retarded persons might argue for substantive constitutional
protection of their basic self-care skills necessary to personal
autonomy. 96 While the majority of severely retarded people will never
be completely self-sufficient,9 7 basic self-care is worthy of
protection.98
A number of fundamental rights are implicated by the loss of basic
self-care skills. For example, lower courts have found that all citizens
have the fundamental rights to defecate and urinate without
government permission and to avoid the odor of one's urine and
feces. 99 If a person is toilet-trained at the time of commitment, but
92. Monaghan, supra note 29, at 433.
93. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250-51 (1976) (M,rshall, J., dissenting);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937
(1970).
94. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
95. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250-53 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting);
Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141, slip op. at 25 (D.N.D. Aug.
31, 1982).
The fact that a retarded person is unable to exercise his autonomy right as fully as
other human beings should,not foreclose his opportunity to exercise it at all. See
Dowben, supra note 42, at 879-80 ("The test of compelling justification for denial of
fundamental rights to citizens is stricter than a mere showing of incompetence of
judgment in certain areas of human functioning. Every human being should be
presumed to have these rights unless someone can show an almost certain probability
of disastrous consequences .... ").
96. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. at 2465 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring).
97. See R. Scheerenberger, supra note 7, at 12.
98. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2464-65 (1982) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring); Brief of the American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae at 6,
Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982). For many mentally retarded people,
the ability to do things for themselves is as much liberty as they will ever know. 102
S. Ct. at 2464 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Liberty is "an incomplete protection if it
encompasses only the right to do momentous acts, leaving the state free to interfere
with those personal aspects of our lives which have no direct bearing on the ability of
others to enjoy their liberty." L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 959 (quoting Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970)); cf. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33,
41 (1915) (right to work for a living is essential to personal freedom); Smith v. Hill,
285 F. Supp. 556, 560-61 (E.D.N.C. 1968) (same).
99. Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1329 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (confinement in
a cell without a toilet is unconstitutional); see LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974,
978 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Wolfish v. Levi, 439 F. Supp.
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loses this skill while confined, 100 the person has lost control over
essential body functions. Although the result of staff inattention, the
consequences are the same as those caused by an affirmative
deprivation by the state.
The Supreme Court has recognized locomotion as a fundamental
right. 101 If post-commitment inactivity causes physical atrophy,10 2
rendering an individual non-ambulatory, the individual cannot
exercise his right to move about within the institution. 0 3 The
consequences are indistinguishable from the effects of actual physical
restraint complained of in Youngberg; 0 4 only the cause of the
immobility differs.
114, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded on other
grounds, 573 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
The above line of cases involved eighth amendment challenges, alleging that
confinement under such conditions constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See
Flakes v. Percy, 511 F. Supp. 1325, 1330-31 (W.D. Wis. 1981). The eighth amend-
ment, however, does not apply to civil confinement. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d
147, 156 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S.
Ct. 2452 (1982); see Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 & n.16 (1979). Rather, the
due process clause applies, and the issue is whether confinement conditions amount
to punishment. Id. at 535. Fifth amendment liberty includes freedom from punish-
ment administered without due process of law. Id. at 536 n.17. It seems, further-
more, that conditions extreme enough to be considered cruel and unusual in the
criminal context must be considered violations of fifth amendment freedom from
punishment in the civil commitment context. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct.
2452, 2458 (1982) ("If it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals
in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily commit-
ted-who may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.") (emphasis added).
100 Brief ot Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 23-24.
101. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-26 (1958); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S.
270, 274 (1900).
102. Herr, supra note 7, at 557; see Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1309 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (institutionalization causes physical
deterioration), aff'd in part on other grounds, rev'd and remanded in part en bane,
612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 391 n.7 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (stagnation or deterioration in
physical ability of residents anticipated by expert viewing institution), afJ'd, re-
manded, and reserved in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974).
103. See Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958) ("[f]reedom of movement is
basic in our scheme of values"); Dowben, supra note 42, at 879-80 (retarded have
same rights as others); cf. Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 752 (1st Cir. 1973) (freedom
to use one's property to get from place to place is protected by due process) (quoting
Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 915 (1953)).
104. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2455 (1982). In the wake of
Youngberg, one court has broadly interpreted the restraint from which the involun-
tarily confined must be free. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-
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The Court has also recognized a fundamental right of association,
arising out of the free speech clause of the first amendment. 05 If,
because of inadequate training, an institutional resident loses the
communication skills and social competence' °6 that he possessed when
committed, the result is similar to that of a deprivation of first
amendment rights. In actuality, the first amendment forbids not the
abridgment of speech, but the abridgment of freedom of speech. 107 If
institutionalization causes an individual to lose his communication
skills, however, he loses the ability to express himself. At least as far as
the individual is concerned, the consequences are far more serious
than abridgment of freedom to express a specific idea. Moreover, loss
of the ability to express basic needs could cause further deterioration
of skills, thus implicating protected rights. 108
In addition, the recognized fundamental rights to personal security
and freedom from restraint are implicated by the Court in
Youngberg. 10 9 The Court held that it may be unreasonable not to
provide training that could significantly reduce the need for physical
restraints or the likelihood of violence. 10 Psychiatric studies have
shown . that training in basic self-care does reduce violent and
self-destructive behavior."' If a lack of training results in loss of skills
141, slip op. at 25 (D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982) (freedom from restraint includes the right
to make minor personal decisions).
105. E.g., Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
106. See R. Scheerenberger, supra note 7, at 31-32; Mitchell & Smeriglio, supra
note 8, at 669; Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 23-24.
107. A. Meiklejohn, Political Freedom 21 (1960). The Court has recognized situa-
tions in which abridgment of speech or other communicationn is constitutionally
permissible. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (obscene material
not protected by first amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942) (fighting words tending to incite an immediate breach of peace not
protected); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (free speech does not
encompass use of words which creates a "clear and present danger"). Generally,
however, the first amendment provides individuals with the right to express ideas
freely. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20-26 (1971) (use of four-letter
word constitutionally protected when not directed to any particular hearer and not
intended to arouse anyone violently); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957)
(mere portrayal of sex is not sufficient reason to deny freedom of speech) (dictum);
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319-20 (1957) (courts must distinguish between
advocacy of revoluntionary action and mere advocacy of abstract doctrine).
108. See Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olson, No. 80-141, slip op. at 27
(D.N.D. Aug. 31, 1982) (communication skills enable the exercise of basic liberties).
109. See Youngberg v. Romeo. 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982).
110. Id. at 2462-63.
111. Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 8, at 11 & nn.29-30 (citing numerous
psychiatric studies); 1981 Term, supra note 10, at 83 & n.47 (same).
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and self-destructive or maladaptive behavior,112 self-care training
serves to prevent the conditions Youngberg seeks to cure.
B. The Duty Not to Deprive
An obstacle to finding a deprivation of rights1 3 in the loss of basic
skills is that such deterioration lacks the character of an affirmative
taking by the state." 4 However, the situation of the institutionalized
retarded is unique, and the Court should, as a matter of policy and
practicality, impose an affirmative duty on the state to act whenever
the consequences of inaction are serious enough to resemble the
deprivation of fundamental rights.l115 In Youngberg, the Supreme
112. See Battle v. Pennsylvania, 629 F.2d 269, 274-75 (3d Cir. 1980) (the severely
or profoundly retarded lose unpracticed skills), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 968 (1981);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1308-10 (E.D.
Pa. 1977) (neglect causes maladaptive behavior), aff'd, rev'd, and remanded in part
on other grounds en banc, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 451
U.S. 1 (1981); Brief for Respondent at 22, Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982) (without training in basic skills, the retarded will lose these skills and become
aggressive and self-destructive); Herr, supra note 7, at 557-58 (lack of treatment leads
to self-destructive behavior).
113. The first section of the fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part:
"nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1 (emphasis added). Enforcement of the
amendment may involve a "restraint" on the state's police power or power of proce-
dure. C.W. Collins, The Fourteenth Amendment and the States 29-30 (1912). "Re-
straint" implies an act, not an omission, by the state. Due process protections,
therefore, are generally implicated when a personal interest is infringed by state
legislation or by an affirmative act of one acting under color of state authority. See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (transferring prisoner to mental
hospital and subjecting him to treatment-affirmative deprivation); Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (civil commitment-affirmative deprivation); Ingra-
ham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 676 (1977) (corporal punishment by school authori-
ties-affirmative deprivation); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-57 (1974)
(revoking prisoner's good time credit in disciplinary proceeding without minimal due
process-affirmative deprivation); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (criminal
abortion statute violating right to privacy-state legislation); Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715, 738 (1972) (unreasonable pre-trial commitment of person incompetent to
stand trial-affirmative deprivation).
114. Compare Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2455 (1982) (physical
restraint of institution resident by means of "shackles" for long periods of time, an
active deprivation of freedom from restraint), with Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp.
387, 391 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (describing state institution as incapable of providing
habilitation, and therefore conducive to deterioration of residents) (quoting Mar. 2,
1972 unreported interim order), affd, remanded, and reserved in part sub nom.
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974), and Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 8, at 10-11 (lack of practice in already-acquired skills causes institutional resi-
dents to "learn helplessness") and Herr, supra note 7, at 557 (lack of treatment and
training causes physical atrophy and intellectual deterioration).
115. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (prison authorities have
affirmative duty to facilitate prisoners' exercise of fundamental right of access to
1983] 1085
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Court established a limited right to the training necessary to safeguard
the rights of bodily security and freedom from restraint." 6 Although
the restraint in Youngberg was the result of state action," 7 the unsafe
institutional conditions that infringed the right to personal security
were not affirmatively created by the state, but rather, were caused
by inaction-failure to provide adequate safeguards." 8 The Court
nonetheless held that the right to bodily security must be protected. " 9
Justice Stevens stated in his dissent in Estelle v. Gamble12 0 :
"[W]hether the constitutional standard has been violated should turn
on the character of the [injury] rather than the motivation of the
individual who inflicted it.' 121 It thus should not matter whether a
deprivation is the result of intent, neglect, or even poverty. 22 This is
especially true in the case of the institutionalized retarded, who are
not "accountable for their plight."'21 3 In Eckerhart v. Hensley,14 the
district court posited that because the mentally retarded person is set
apart from society when committed, he receives only the treatment
the state chooses to provide. 25 As a result of this isolation, a person
courts); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19-20 (1956) (plurality opinion) (state must
enable convicted defendant with right of appeal to obtain adequate and effective
appellate review); L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 919 (emerging notions that government
has an affirmative obligation to provide "minimally decent subsistence" for basic
human needs are consistent with a notion that government omission can be as serious
as government action).
116. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460-63 (1982).
117. See id. at 2455 (institution resident physically restrained by "shackles" for
long periods of time).
118. Id. (respondent injured by himself and other residents, institution staff failed
to employ appropriate preventive procedures).
119. See id. at 2458.
120. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). In Estelle, a prison inmate claimed an eighth amendment
violation when prison authorities failed to provide adequate treatment for injuries
and illness from which he was suffering. Id. at 99-101. To determine whether the
state inaction violated the prisoner's rights, the Court established a "deliberate
indifference" standard. Id. at 106. The Court has since stated that this standard does
not apply to the rights of the institutionalized retarded. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S.
Ct. 2452, 2456 n.11 (1982).
121. 429 U.S. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 116-17 & nn.12-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens noted that intent
should not be necessary for a violation of the eighth amendment. He maintained that
the state has an affirmative duty to provide minimally adequate health care to those
in its custody. Id. at 116 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Youngberg v. Romeo, 102
S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982) (state concedes duty to provide adequate food, shelter,
clothing and medical care).
123. L. Tribe, supra note 28, at 919. The notion that people are often accountable
for their own plight is an argument against the imposition of affirmative duties on
the state. See id. The plight of the institutionalized retarded, however, is not of their
own making.
124. 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D. Mo. 1979).
125. Id. at 914.
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committed against his will should have a right to minimally adequate
treatment. 2 6  Although the Supreme Court has declared that
government need not remove from the path of freedom those obstacles
"not of its own creation,"12 7 the state in effect creates such an obstacle,
through its inattention to an institutionalized retarded person, when it
causes that person to lose the skills he possessed prior to commitment.
C. Balancing State Interests
If loss of basic self-care skills is considered the constitutional
equivalent of deprivation of established fundamental rights, the
Supreme Court's directive that substantive protection be accorded
only to those rights that are either expressly or implicitly mandated by
the Constitution will be satisfied.' 28 Given the implication of
fundamental rights, the state must demonstrate an overriding interest
to justify an infringement of that right. 12 9 Therefore, to override an
individual's interest in the preservation of his self-care skills during
institutionalization, the state must show that its failure to train is a
necessary means to achieve a compelling state interest.13
0
Among the state interests that may be balanced against an
institutional resident's fundamental rights13' are security concerns,
126. See id. at 915.
127. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (emphasis added).
128. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. The Court can then use this
constitutional predicate to impose an affirmative duty on the state. See Youngberg v.
Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 n.25 (1982).
129. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) ("compelling state interest"); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (powerful countervailing state interest); Romeo
v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane) (overriding interest),
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982); see Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (important state interest).
130. Cf. Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (infringe-
ment of right to vote valid only if necessary to compelling state interest); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (burden on right to travel valid only if necessary
to compelling state interest). "[State action] must be narrowly drawn to express only
the legitimate state interests at stake." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
The Court has not always been precise in characterizing the interest that the state
must assert when adversely affecting fundamental rights. Schwartz, supra note 28, at
876-77 & nn.66 & 74; see, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978)
(interference with right to marry requires "important" state interest); Procunier v.
Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 (1974) (censorship of prison mail must be justified by
sufficiently "important or substantial" interest); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651
(1972) (interference with right to custody of one's children requires "powerful coun-
tervailing" interest).
131. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2460 (1982); see Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (due process represents "the balance
which our Nation ...has struck between [individual] liberty and the demands of
organized society."); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 363 (1959) ("[D]ue process
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fiscal constraints and administrative necessities.1 32 Preserving an
institution's internal security is a primary concern which may require
limitation of the rights retained by the individual after
confinement. 33 A lack of training, however, can cause aggressive,
violent, or self-destructive behavior,134 thereby threatening, not
facilitating, internal security. Therefore, with training, and the
resulting preservation of self-care skills, will come a more secure
environment.
The Supreme Court has taken the view that at some point a
constitutional right must be subordinated if enforcement of that right
directly conflicts with fiscal and administrative necessity. 135 A number
of circuit courts adhere to a different position, finding that cost is not
a concern when constitutional rights are involved.136 One court has
added, however, that once minimum treatment is provided, courts
should be hesitant in requiring the allocation of resources necessary
for ideal treatment. 37 In Youngberg, the Supreme Court stated that,
given fiscal and administrative limitations, treatment decisions of
professionals affecting institution residents must bear a presumption
of correctness.' 3 8
compels inquiry into the nature of the demand ... upon individual freedom ...
and the justification of social need."), overruled on other grounds, Camara v. Munic-
ipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
132. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 159 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
133. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 540, 546-47 (1979).
134. See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
135. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976). Mathews, however,
dealt with the cost of additional procedural safeguards-administrative hearings-
and with the cost of disability payments made to ineligible persons before a determi-
nation of ineligibility can be made. Id. at 348-49.
136. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 161 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane) ("Humane
considerations and constitutional requirements are not, in this day, to be measured or
limited by dollar considerations.") (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580
(8th Cir. 1968)), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1315 (5th Cir. 1974) (same); Rozecki v. Gaughan,
459 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1972) (same); accord Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 499
(D. Minn. 1974) ("[I]nadequate resources can never be an adequate justification for
the state's depriving any person of his constitutional rights.") (citing Inmates of
Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676, 687 (D. Mass. 1973), aff'd, 494
F.2d 1196 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 977 (1974)), affd in part, vacated and
remanded in part on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Wyatt v.
Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 387, 392 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (want of funds cannot justify
failure to provide minimum care and training), afJ'd, remanded, and reserved in
part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
137. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 168 (3d Cir. 1980) (en bane) (noting
"considerable" gap that may exist between available and needed resources), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
138. 102 S. Ct. at 2463.
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RIGHTS OF THE MENTALLY RETARDED
Basic self-care training is, by its nature, neither administratively
demanding nor fiscally burdensome. The state should gauge the skills
an individual possessed at the time of commitment 139 and make
certain that those skills are consistently practiced. 140 No judicial
determination of the reasonableness of a particular form of training is
needed14' and self-care training will not require a significant increase
in state expenditures. 42
It is far from clear that not providing training in basic self-care
skills serves state interests. In fact, training that preserves the basic
skills of institution residents may lessen the burden of supervisory care
that would be imposed on the state if all such residents were instead
rendered helpless by institutionalization. 43
CONCLUSION
Justice Blackmun's suggestion in Youngberg that the Constitution
provides the institutionalized retarded a right to the training necessary
to preserve their basic self-care skills must not be quietly overlooked.
139. See Seevers, Assessing Programmatic Aspects of the Problem, in Shaping the
Future 32 (P. Roos, B. McCann & M. Addison eds. 1980) (assessment of patient's
skills is one step in determining proper residential program).
140. Cf. Patterson, Developing Residential Services in the Community, in Shap-
ing the Future 143 (P. Roos, B. McCann & M. Addison eds. 1980) (in community-
based residential program, "the resident must have consistent opportunities to prac-
tice necessary skills"). Initially, practice of basic skills will require specific
reinforcement, but over time the reinforcement may be varied or employed less
frequently, so that the skills nearly become self-sustaining. See Nawas & Braun, An
Overview of Behavior Modification with the Severely and Profoundly Retarded: Part
III. Maintenance of Change and Epilogue, in Vocational Rehabilitation of the
Mentally Retarded 20-23 (L. Daniels ed. 1974).
141. When the reasonableness of the form of training must be determined, the
determination is to be made by a professional. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct.
2452, 2461-63 (1982) (in determining what is reasonable, courts must show deference
to the judgment of a qualified professional); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 n.3
(4th Cir. 1977) (courts cannot prescribe techniques, though they can require treat-
ment when it is obviously called for). It is the professional who ultimately must
determine whether the program is benefiting particular residents.
142. Studies indicate that increases in expenses and personnel do not guarantee
better care; how personnel are used is more telling. McCormick, Balla & Zigler,
Resident-Care Practices in Institutions for Retarded Persons: A Cross-Institutional,
Cross-Cultural Study, 80 Am. J. Mental Deficiency 1, 14 (1975). Results of one study
showed that only five percent of aides' time was devoted to formal training of
residents, with most contact between aides and residents in ward management and
custodial contexts. Veit, Allen & Chinsky, Interpersonal Interactions between Insti-
tutionalized Retarded Children and Their Attendants, 80 Am. J. Mental Deficiency
535, 541 (1976); see Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305, 1311 (5th Cir. 1974) (treat-
ment geared mainly toward housekeeping functions).
143. See Nawas & Braun, supra note 140, at 21 (by freeing the staff of chores like
changing the diapers of the retarded person, self-care of the retarded allows staffers
to devote time to more rewarding duties).
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Although Justice Blackmun did not specify a recognized constitutional
right on which to predicate an affirmative duty on the state, his
concurring opinion serves the purpose of recognizing that such a duty
should be imposed. The consequences of the loss of basic skills are
similar to the consequences of the deprivation of certain fundamental
rights. Therefore, absent a compelling state interest that would
necessitate state inaction, the state has an affirmative duty to prevent
the loss of basic self-care skills. Not only does the state lack such a
compelling interest, but preservation of basic skills may advance the
state interest in the efficient administration of facilities for the
institutionalized mentally retarded.
John Adams Rizzo
